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By Nyada Ralek
KENYA’S uncompetitive
sugar industry has to reduce its costs by at least a third to
achieve any level of viability, a new study says.
The study, carried out by a World Bank lead economist, Donald
Mitchell, and whose preliminary findings have been made available
to BioSafety News, is an indictment of an industry whose unending
trials and travails have left a bitter taste on the mouths of
the more than 100,000 small-holder growers who account for nine
out of 10kg of sugar produced in the country.
It says that even after all duties and levies are paid, domestic
sugar is still tagged at 50 per cent higher than its imported
counterpart when it finally finds its way into the supermarket
shelves, if it does at all.
Imported sugar currently attracts a punitive and protectionist
100 per cent duty on top of a 16 per cent Value Added Tax (VAT)
and a 7 per cent sugar development levy (SDL). And this excludes
the corresponding value of income taxes.
Besides, imports from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (Comesa) Free Trade Area states, which enjoy tariff-free
access to the Kenyan market, have been limited to a 200,000-tonne
ceiling to just fill a gaping local deficit of the same quantum.
Anything above this threshold is a fair game for the normal
slate of taxes and levies.
But with the Comesa quota limit expected to expire in three
years, on February 28, 2008, time is clearly running out, and
Mitchell argues that there is urgent work to be done.
The measure, which enabled Kenya to wriggle out of its Comesa
peers last year, was intended to give local producers a temporary
reprieve as they try to put their farms and factories in a competitive
gear.
The tragedy is that despite its conditional strictures, there
is no tangible evidence on the ground that the country has fashioned
out any coherent and bankable farm-to-factory strategy to enable
the producers to compete with the ever-growing number of traditional
low-cost producers such as the Sudan, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia
and Egypt.
According to the study, the salvation for the local industry
lies in privatising the state-owned firms, whose diminishing
influence is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that they
currently produce just 40 per cent of all the local sugar despite
being in the clear majority at five out of seven factories in
the country.
The study holds aloft the example of Mumias Sugar, which implemented
a successful Initial Public Offer (IPO) at the Nairobi Stock
Exchange about two years ago, as a mascot for what may be achieved
through a well executed privatisation exercise.
Mumias’ private sector orientation, which has seen it
head-hunt respected names in the Kenyan corporate land such
as the current chief executive, Evans Kidero, is credited for
its relatively good performance, compared to its counterparts.
For instance, it is the only local mill that has had a recent
history of profit-making, recording positive earnings except
for 1989/99 and 2002/3.
The study also observes that besides its relatively more commercial
orientation, the western Kenya-based operator also has several
factors going for it, such as a modern, well-managed factory,
international competitiveness, manageable debt, good management
and a tendency to pay its claimants promptly.
In Mitchell’s study, the prognosis is indeed grim for
the other government-owned factories like Sony (South Nyanza),
Chemelil, Nzoia, Muhoroni and Miwani, which are characterised
as unprofitable and saddled by a huge debt burden.
“They use outdated equipment, sometimes as old as 30 years.
They experience frequent breakdowns and are increasingly expensive
to maintain. Management was not hired on merit, especially by
the previous government. They are slow to pay farmers for cane
and provide inputs such as fertilizer,” the study catalogues.
Kenya’s long trail of inefficiency in sugar production
straddles the farm to the mills, which produce only 400,000
tonnes against an aggregate demand of 600,000; occasioning the
importation of about 200,000 tonnes annually to fill up the
deficit.
Most of the firms depend on small out-grower units, which average
0.8 hectares to meet their demand for raw sugar cane. This ensures
that large-scale, quality-controlled and scientific crop husbandry
a la most of Kenya’s competitors, is not possible on most
of the farms.
Not much improvement in the form of farm consolidation and even
better on-farm production is expected in the foreseeable future
as the truth is that with the ongoing population explosion in
Western Kenya, where the Kenyan sugar-belt is domiciled, cane
plot size is declining by about 2 per cent a year.
Factors like higher transportation costs on the back of longer
hauling distances as out-grower hinterlands expand for most
of the factories and roads deteriorate have only served to exacerbate
the problem.
Research, which is the mandate of the poorly equipped Kenya
Sugar Research Foundation (KESRF), and for which consumers fork
out the 7 cent SDL on every kilogramme of sugar bought, is chronically
stunted. The study concludes that as a result, most cane varieties
used in the country are slow maturing and outdated.
The study notes that KESRF needs to invest more effort and resources
on developing shorter maturing varieties and having them widely
adopted by farmers.
The study demonstrates that the biggest allocation of production
costs go to transport, and with Kenya’s run-down road
infrastructure not getting any better, it is easy to see why.
Other major claimants as far as production costs go include
harvesting, interest on inputs, labor and fertilizer. Seed cane
and levies also account for substantial costs.
On the factory floors, huge levels of inefficiency have resulted
in an epidemic of under-capacity with only Mumias operating
over 8 per cent of the time it is supposed to.
Tellingly, West Kenya, which is also the only other privately
owned sugar mill in the country, comes a close second in the
capacity utilization stakes at about 76 per cent.
The rest of the pack, which consists of government-owned mills
like Sony, Nzoia, Muhoroni, Chemelil and Miwani, wallow in the
under 65 per cent realm.
So-called out-grower companies are no better, which most small
satellites of their bigger parents.
Mitchell fingers electricity as one of the areas where the factories
could cut substantial costs, by generating their own power through
the use of sugar-cane residue (bagasse)
“Co-generation of electricity provides an opportunity
for adding value to the sugar industry by selling electricity,
besides reducing the cost of electricity, which is already high
in Kenya at 8-12 cents per kilowatt hour, besides its demand
massively outstripping supply,” says the study.
It takes serious issue with levies like the SDL, which besides
making sugar inordinately expensive are no better than a subsidy
from profitable mills and consumers to unprofitable and inefficient
factories and out-grower firms.
It is indeed a vicious cycle in which those who toil to make
a return on investment are forced to finance the profligate
ways of poorly managed State parastatals and the politically-appointed
mandarins that run them.
The Kenya Sugar Board (KSB), which is the government’s
agency for regulating the industry, also comes in for some flak;
especially in the way it has been allocating import quotas.
The study notes that the way the system is structured currently
hands out huge rents to private firms and calls for a different
and more distributive allocation system
As the Kenyan sugar industry continues to turn sour, assailed
by a litany of woes, it is the consumer who continues to get
the wrong end of the stick. The truth is that Kenyans are being
asked to pay for the inefficiency of local producers.
Consumers pay about 50-60 per cent more for sugar that they
would if imports were fully liberalized.
For an indispensable part of the human diet, which accounts
for about 11 per cent of all our total calorie needs, the government
must move fast to prescribe workable options. Or we get ready
to bury what remains of our local sugar industry, and in the
same grave a thousand livelihoods come 2008.
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